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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1247 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH McGAVITT, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-10-cr-00114-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 24, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Kenneth McGavitt challenges his conviction for two counts of mail fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. McGavitt alleges the District Court abused its discretion 
by denying his request for a trial continuance and by excluding evidence of a 
Government witness‟s prior conviction. He further alleges the evidence presented at his 
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trial was insufficient to convict him. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm his 
conviction and sentence.  
I. 
 
 Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 
for our resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
1
  
 McGavitt leased space in two properties he owned in Western Pennsylvania to 
VisionQuest, a company that provides intervention services for at-risk youth. Beginning 
in February 2002, VisionQuest leased property in Washington, Pennsylvania (the 
“Washington Property”) for $10,000 a month through January 2005. Beginning in March 
2004, VisionQuest leased property in Donegal, Pennsylvania (the “Donegal Property”) 
for $20,000 a month for five years, and agreed to occupy only the fourth floor while 
subletting the bottom three back to McGavitt. Towards the end of 2004, VisionQuest 
began renegotiating both leases in order to reduce costs and avoid long-term obligations. 
The new lease for the Washington Property, signed in January 2005, reduced rent to 
$2,000 and allowed for termination with 90 days‟ notice. The new lease for the Donegal 
Property, signed in December 2004, kept rent at $20,000 but also allowed for termination 
with 90 days‟ notice.  
 In 2006, McGavitt sold the Washington Property to Bradley Reese. McGavitt 
induced Wesbanco to finance the sale by falsely representing that VisionQuest was still 
                                              
1
 Evidence supporting the facts detailed below was presented at trial. Due to McGavitt‟s 
conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United 
States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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paying $10,000 a month under the 2002 lease. McGavitt also failed to disclose that 
VisionQuest was nearly a year behind on its rent.  
 Later in 2006, McGavitt applied for a $3,000,000 loan from Business Loan 
Express Capital (“BLX”) in order to pay down some debts (the “BLX loan”). McGavitt 
used the Donegal Property, and its revenue, as collateral. He falsely represented that 
VisionQuest was paying $24,000 a month under the 2004 lease with no early termination 
provision. Since the revenue stream was critical to the loan application, BLX informed 
McGavitt he would need to negotiate a ten-year lease with VisionQuest at a higher 
monthly rent payment. 
 McGavitt assured BLX that VisionQuest would rent the third and fourth floors of 
the Donegal Property for $29,000 a month. BLX approved the loan, provided that 
McGavitt submit documentation of the lease extension prior to closing. McGavitt created 
an amendment to the Donegal Property lease that showed a rent increase and ten-year 
extension. One of McGavitt‟s employees forged the signatures of VisionQuest‟s Director 
and CEO. McGavitt‟s employee also forged a document that would hold VisionQuest 
liable for the loan if McGavitt defaulted. McGavitt falsified notary stamps on the 
documents and then instructed another employee to fax the documents to his attorney 
from VisionQuest‟s fax machine, which they had access to at the shared Donegal 
Property. McGavitt‟s attorney FedExed the documents to BLX, and also FedExed a 
check, drawn from the loan proceeds, to one of McGavitt‟s creditors, a county tax 
authority.  
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VisionQuest terminated the Donegal Property lease in November 2006. Soon after, 
McGavitt defaulted on the BLX loan. When BLX approached VisionQuest to repay the 
loan, VisionQuest notified it that the signatures on the documents were forgeries.  
 On June 9, 2010, McGavitt was indicted on two counts of mail fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. One count was for the documents that McGavitt‟s attorney FedExed 
to BLX and the other was for the check from the BLX loan proceeds that McGavitt‟s 
attorney FedExed to the county tax authority. McGavitt was not charged with any fraud 
in connection with the Washington Property.  
 Prior to trial, McGavitt‟s counsel sought and obtained four continuances totaling 
300 days for the filing of pretrial motions. He sought a fifth continuance due to personal 
matters as well as the “significant amount of documents” to be reviewed for trial, which 
the District Court denied. After a two-day trial, the jury found McGavitt guilty on both 
counts of the indictment. App. 28. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review both the denial of a trial continuance 
and exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 
305 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2004).  In 
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction “[w]e review the 
record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wolfe, 245 F.3d 
at 261. 
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A. 
McGavitt argues that the District Court erred in denying his attorney‟s request for 
a trial continuance. District courts have “wide latitude” in exercising discretion to grant 
or deny continuances. United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1986). In the 
exercise of discretion, courts should consider “the efficient administration of criminal 
justice; the accused‟s rights, including an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense; and 
the rights of other defendants awaiting trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance.” 
United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1991). The denial of a continuance 
will only be reversed if the denial is “so arbitrary as to violate [the accused‟s] due process 
[rights].” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).  
McGavitt was indicted on June 9, 2010. His attorney received four extensions, 
totaling 300 days, to file pretrial motions. The first three extensions were “to review 
materials” while the fourth was to “determine how to proceed.” App. 22, 24, 26, 307. On 
May 18, 2011 the District Court set the case for trial beginning July 5, 2011. On June 3, 
2011, McGavitt‟s attorney sought a trial continuance for the “significant amount of 
documents” to be reviewed. App. 28. The District Court denied the request based on the 
already significant delay of the case due to the four prior continuances. Ultimately, 
McGavitt‟s attorney acknowledged that he would “be ready to try” the case on whichever 
date he was called to do so.
2
 App. 37.  
                                              
2
 Indeed, this was not a complex case and the trial was just over two days from opening 
to verdict.  
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While McGavitt argues that more time would have put him in a better position to 
raise a defense, we review a district court‟s denial of a continuance for an arbitrary abuse 
of discretion that may impair the defendant‟s due process rights, not for whether the 
defendant may have been able to craft a better defense. “[T]he fact that something is 
arguable does not make it unconstitutional,” and McGavitt has not shown that the District 
Court‟s denial of his continuance motion was so arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 591. 
B.  
McGavitt next argues that the District Court erred in excluding evidence of 
Government witness Bradley Reese‟s prior felony conviction for possession of child 
pornography. In evaluating whether evidence of a witness‟s criminal history should be 
admitted under Fed. R. Evid. (“Rule”) 609, courts have considered “(1) the kind of crime 
involved; (2) when the conviction occurred; (3) the importance of the witness‟ testimony 
to the case; (4) the importance of the credibility of the defendant.” Gov’t of the V. I. v. 
Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982). Rule 609 evidence may not be admitted if, 
under Rule 403, the trial court finds that “its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; Bedford, 671 F.2d at 761.  
Reese‟s testimony involved McGavitt‟s false representations about the 
Washington Property and McGavitt‟s employees‟ access to VisionQuest fax machines. It 
was admitted to show McGavitt‟s motive to defraud BLX and to establish a pattern of 
conduct. The District Court, after hearing Reese‟s testimony, granted the Government‟s 
motion to exclude the conviction. The Court issued an opinion concluding that Reese‟s 
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conviction “has very little (if any) bearing upon [Reese]‟s veracity or credibility. Further, 
its relative prejudicial value, especially given the nature of the criminal conduct, is great.” 
Supp. App. 60 (citing United States v. Ivins, No. 09-320, 2010 WL 2635799 (E.D. Pa. 
June 28, 2010) (holding evidence of a child pornography conviction did not weigh 
heavily on the issue of veracity and was highly prejudicial)). Thus, the District Court‟s 
exclusion of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 
C. 
 McGavitt‟s final argument is that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to convict him. We apply a deferential standard and must sustain a conviction when, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, “any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Appellant 
“bears a very heavy burden” in raising an insufficiency of the evidence claim. Id.  
McGavitt argues the evidence was insufficient to show he “knowingly participated 
in the preparation, execution and delivery of” the Fedexed documents.  To prove mail 
fraud, the government must establish “(1) a scheme to defraud; (2) use of the mails to 
further the scheme; and (3) fraudulent intent.” United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 
572-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). McGavitt states there was no evidence 
that he prepared the fraudulent documents or mailed them, and argues this “evidentiary 
void” renders the evidence insufficient. Appellant Br. 54. However, “[w]here one does an 
act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business 
. . . then he „causes‟ the mails to be used.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 
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(1954). There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find McGavitt caused the use of the 
mails, as his attorney was acting on his behalf when he mailed the documents and the 
check, and McGavitt could foresee this use of the mails. McGavitt has not overcome his 
heavy burden to show no rationale trier could have found him guilty.  
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court‟s Judgment of 
conviction and sentence.  
